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Introduction 
Labor Law in Transition—Between 
Law and Industrial Relations 
Over the last decade Israeli labor law—and, more generally, social law—has 
changed dramatically. The changes are not easily viewed from the outside. The 
two laws governing collective labor relations—namely, the Collective Agree-
ments Law (1957) and the Settlement of Industrial Disputes Law (1957)—have 
hardly been touched. A broad range of new laws has not seemed to alter the 
basic premises of Israeli labor law but has merely dealt with issues not touched 
upon in previous legislation, most notably in the area of antidiscrimination and 
equal opportunities. The case law, developed in a common-law fashion, draws 
on self-reference and always cites previous cases to prove that little has changed 
and that most new developments are the result of incremental development. 
These convenient images of continuity conceal what the agents of law (judges, 
legislatures, labor lawyers, and NGOs) are all well aware of: labor law has 
changed dramatically, and nothing has been left intact. 
There is no single legal anchor that can demonstrate the nature of this 
change. Instead, an accumulation of changes has affected the whole. The ex-
isting laws of collective bargaining, dismissals, and equality have been trans-
formed. The definition of "employee" has been rewritten over a short period 
of time. The courts gradually nudged aside the traditional doctrine of "em-
ployment at will" and replaced it with the "just cause" rule. Labor law, at all 
levels, has been constitutionalized. New doctrinal fields of labor law have 
emerged: employment equality; rights and obligations in the process of collec-
tive bargaining; the law of trade union organization drives; the law on the 
permissible scope of strikes; and the law of employees' rights in the process of 
corporate mergers, acquisitions, and restructuring. Changes are not always in 
the areas most readers would expect to find them. For example, the guarantee 
of national health care insurance since 1995 introduced a radical rewriting of 
health law but also implied a considerable rewriting of labor law at the same 
time. The current state of affairs indicates that most legal references from 
more than ten years ago have become outdated. 
The types of changes that can be deciphered upon a close reading of the 
Israeli legal system are more commonly apparent in transitional political 
regimes. Yet in Israel there was no political revolution. Although in 1977 the 
right-wing Likud Party ended the hegemony of the Labor Party, which had 
been in political control from the founding of the state in 1948, the transition 
was democratic and did not alter the basic political foundations of the state. 
Israel did not go through the processes of transition that have been character-
istic of, for example, Eastern Europe. The political transformation also pre-
dated changes in labor law by at least a decade. Moreover, much of the newly 
protective labor law has been legislated during the years in which the right-
wing party has ruled. It is therefore not possible to directly link changes in law 
with the left-right changes in the Israeli political map. A relationship exists, 
but there are too many gaps to be filled. 
How, then, do we explain the extensive legal transition in Israel? There are 
two common ways of doing this. The first is to account for law's transition by 
drawing on legal reasoning. This type of explanation suggests, for example, that 
the changes in labor law are a result of changing jurisprudence. The Supreme 
Court has developed a jurisprudence that draws on values, purposes, and 
balancing-of-rights tests. Consequently, the law is more commonly phrased in 
terms of good faith, human dignity, reasonableness, public policy, and the like. 
Two basic laws on human rights were passed in 1992 and have been acknowl-
edged to comprise a constitution in a state traditionally thought of as having 
none. The Supreme Court has extended the protection of human rights to the 
private sphere. All of these general changes affected labor law. This type of ex-
planation, however, is not sufficient. It does not explain why many branches of 
the law have generally remained intact while labor law has changed. Moreover, 
the explanations fail because they are self-referential. They do not explain why 
the general principles changed as well. At a higher level of abstraction, these ex-
planations conceive of all changes in law as being derived from within the legal 
system itself. They assume that the legal system is closed and that it develops its 
own rhetoric, logic, and structures. Changes may have taken place because 
some rules simply didn't work. Others rules were needed instead. These expla-
nations assume that there are benchmarks by which to measure the outcomes of 
the legal system and decide when they should be replaced. These benchmarks 
may include consistency, clarity, preference for judicial discretion over rules, 
and the like. Yet this legalistic explanation is not really satisfying either. It does 
not explain why the previous regime of labor law no longer performed well 
enough? Where did it fail? Moreover, problems of consistency and clarity re-
quire only relatively technical adjustments in the law. Such changes hardly ac-
count for the scope of the change in labor law. 
There are, of course, variations to this first type of explanation. For example, 
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i first type of explanation. For example, 
isis on personalities. Many changes in 
labor law are often explained as a result of the changing composition of the 
Labor Court. The president of the National Labor Court resigned in 1997 and 
was replaced by one with different views and a different temperament. More 
sophisticated explanations explain changes in labor law by reference to 
changes in the general jurisprudence of Israel and point to the importance of 
Chief Justice Barak, the president of the Supreme Court in Israel, in inducing 
change. These explanations can probably account for one change or another, 
but they hardly succeed in capturing the complexity of transformation and the 
multiple agents involved in the process. They assume that the law is a one-
person show. They don't explain, and in fact lack the tools to explain, whether 
these unique personalities could have achieved the same changes under differ-
ent circumstances. They can't account for changes that take place outside the 
courtroom, and they ignore the role of the legislature. They are not satisfac-
tory because they assume, just like the previous type of explanation, that the 
legal system can be explained by reference to the legal system itself. They are 
even more disconcerting than those previous explanations because they cannot 
be rigorously tested and are often more dependent on anecdote than on fact. 
Unlike the law-centered explanation, there is an alternative type of explana-
tion to the rapid rewriting of labor law, which is characterized by disregard, 
lack of interest, and even hostility toward the legal reasoning itself. These 
views are more difficult to characterize because in their external appearance 
they are usually silent about the law. There are books about transformation, 
books about society, and books about labor, in all of which the analysis hardly 
touches upon the legal rule. When law is mentioned, it is deemed to be exoge-
nous to the study of economic, social, and political systems. It's not that any-
one suggests that laws do not exist but only that law doesn't really matter. 
Law is held to be a passive reflection of market pressures, the electorate's 
power, and social processes. To understand law it is therefore necessary to 
study other systems. But once the study of other systems is undertaken, the 
study of law actually becomes no longer interesting in itself and is relegated to 
the lawyers, who can deal with law's internal logic and rhetoric in their quint-
essential professional manner. 
The two views of legal transformation are not really in tension with one an-
other. They actually share a fundamental assumption. Both views relegate law 
to a separate sphere of inquiry. Gouging a strict divide between the legal and 
other social systems may be methodologically convenient but not convincing. 
To overcome this imposed division of labor, the fundamental premise of this 
book is that law is not simply a mirror of other processes, for it has also taken 
part in constituting them. Law and industrial relations are autonomous sys-
tems, each with its own agents, institutions, modes of strategic interaction, 
and communications. The political and social systems have used law to strate-
gically affect the nature of the industrial relations system that was being incre-
mentally constructed. But law also reflected the range of strategic interactions 
among the agents of other systems, particularly the industrial relations sys-
tem. The proposed explanation for the new labor law is therefore based on the 
interaction between the legal and the industrial relations systems, without as-
suming that one is exogenous to the other. 
Juxtaposing law and industrial relations side by side allows another kind of 
explanation for the transformation that has taken place in both systems. The 
argument made in this book is that the rapid disintegration and current rewrit-
ing of labor law are a response to the collapse of what was (roughly) a corpo-
ratist regime. At the same time law also constituted the corporatist regime and 
took an active role in constituting the new system. 
The original web of rules constructing Israeli labor law was developed for 
several decades from the foundation of a corporatist industrial relations system 
in pre-statehood Palestine until after the foundation of the Israeli state. At the 
peak of what is designated here as "corporatist labor law," sometime in the 
1980s, the legal rules were intended to minimize legal intervention and entrench 
the autonomy of the social partners (i.e., trade unions and employers' associa-
tions). Law further supported and protected a unique system of interests repre-
sentation that was characterized by centralization, concentration of interests, 
and the delegation of power from the state to the active associations in the in-
dustrial relations system. The corporatist model was therefore to construct "a 
law without law"—that is, a law based on the autonomous making of norms 
and not by means of state-authored instruments (laws and adjudication). 
A second phase of labor law began in the late 1980s; this book takes the 
year 1987 to be the pivotal year, although any single date is probably artificial 
and oversimplified. In 1987 the Minimum Wage Law was passed after more 
than ten years of political deliberations, expropriating the determination of a 
national minimum wage from collective bargaining. Soon thereafter other le-
gal developments followed. The second phase of labor law came in tandem 
with the gradual decline of the Israeli corporatist system, and a mismatch be-
came apparent. The corporatist nature of the Israeli system faded. Member-
ship rates in trade unions and the coverage of collective agreements declined. 
Collective bargaining became decentralized, and the concentration of interests 
representation that prevailed in the past was no longer sustained. The declin-
ing role of collective agreements was compensated for by a growing use of 
regulation and by the lively intervention of nongovernmental organizations in 
the struggle over regulation. The corporatist system was gradually replaced by 
a pluralist alternative. 
The labor law that was devised to entrench the corporatist system was no 
longer adaptable and did not respond to the problems that arose once the cen-
tralized and autonomous making of norms was no longer regularly negoti-
ated. At this stage, the state-centered authors of labor law—most notably the 
legislature, courts and executive branch—as well as new agents in civil society, 
scarred an intensive phase of rewriting labor law. It was quite clear that the de-
cline of the corporatist system not only rendered labor law at that time inap-
propriate but also made planned reform impossible. To compensate for the 
decline of corporatism, legal arrangements were expected to provide a new set 
of agreed-upon, acceptable, and suitable norms. Yet the same causes underlying 
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the decline of the corporatist agreement also prevented negotiations over a gen-
eral social pact to guide reform. Labor law was therefore rewritten piecemeal, 
without a unified agenda and by numerous agents. 
Unlike the first phase of labor law, which sought to entrench corporatism, 
the second phase sought to construct a new system. In this process, the objec-
tives of labor law have changed. What seems to be a dense web of incremental 
developments is actually more than just a quantitative change. The second 
phase of labor law is qualitatively different because it provides a different con-
cept of law and its relation to other social systems, most notably the industrial 
relations system. The previous legal regime sought to a great extent to isolate 
industrial relations from legal rules and entitlements and to leave the defini-
tion of rights and duties to the social partners. The current system is based on 
stricter, far-reaching, and intrusive legal rules that govern individuals as well 
as the social partners. Law was transformed from a facilitative into a govern-
ing instrument. 
The decline of the Israeli corporatist structure was relatively rapid. The cur-
rent system is transitory in nature and therefore defies simple classifications, 
and it certainly contradicts any simple thesis regarding the convergence of la-
bor regulation in the global village. It is, however, a fascinating laboratory for 
transformation, as the relatively rapid pace and nature of decline highlight dif-
ferences between systems. From a legal system that was based on instruments 
and premises characteristic of corporatist and semicorporatist regimes that 
prevail in continental Europe, Israeli labor law has turned to rapidly adopting 
institutions molded in American law. The Israeli laboratory allows a compari-
son that is usually difficult to make. The cleavage between the American and 
Swedish systems, for example, allows only a limited scope of comparison, un-
like extensive comparisons that can be made between similarly designed systems 
such as those of the United States and Canada or the Netherlands and Belgium. 
However, the comparison between the polarized corporatist and pluralist mod-
els of labor law in Israel is feasible because the changes took place in the same 
country over a relatively short period of time. 
While the case study of Israel has comparative implications that extend be-
yond Israel's borders, it is also strongly rooted in local history, society, and the 
political economy. The discussion of labor law in this book is not intended to 
be a comprehensive treatise on the subject. It follows a selective approach that 
seeks to highlight particular features that are instructive even for those who 
are not interested in law per se. It chooses various cases, statutes, and other 
legal instruments that can shed light on society. 
Labor law serves multiple roles in this scholarly analysis of transformation. 
First, labor law is akin to a variable that is being explained. As argued at the 
outset, labor law did not change because of changes in the legal system but be-
cause of changes in the industrial relations system. Second, labor law is stud-
ied as an important instrument for mobilizing change. The study of how 
corporatism was replaced cannot ignore the changing structure of law. Third, 
labor law is also a social text. It substantiates nonlegal claims that are often 
difficult to demonstrate. For example, when scholars and participants in pop-
ular debates refer to the growing individualism that has taken hold in Israel, 
such statements are often supported by very impressionistic accounts. Some of 
these statements sound like a longing for better days. Yet a careful reading of 
the law provides a rich text from which social values can be deciphered. All 
three references to "the law" are developed throughout this book. 
The Functions of Labor Law 
To serve the multiple references to law, "labor law" here is defined broadly to 
include all legal instruments that affect the labor market. It can be argued that 
such a broad definition is overinclusive, as many legal rules have a direct or in-
direct impact on the labor market. A change in the general law of contracts, 
constitutional law, or tax policy can have a significant effect on the contrac-
tual component of labor law. However, because this book does not provide a 
comprehensive discussion of all labor law, the expansive scope is valid as it 
does not limit the discussion a priori to any particular, potentially underinclu-
sive classifications of labor law. Labor law is not defined on the basis of a par-
ticular ideological justification ("all laws that protect workers"; "laws that 
remedy market failures"), nor is it defined technically as drawing only on le-
gal instruments that are explicitly intended to reform the rules applying to the 
labor market ("statutory labor standards"). Instead I include within labor law 
any kind of regulation that is instrumental to its functions. At a high level of 
generality, labor law has three functions. These are independent of the type of 
industrial relations system and are in my view applicable to labor law in all 
regimes. They are therefore used here as an organizing (but not explanatory) 
device that helps to unfold and present the many tiers of transformation. 
The first function of labor law is to define where the regulation of labor 
takes place: in the private or public spheres or in civil society. This is labor 
law's metalevel. It determines which system of norms prevails when several 
systems compete. Law determines whether collective agreements prevail over 
individual contracts and how statutes apply to both. It can also determine the 
relationship between norms that are negotiated at the sector level and those 
determined at the workplace level. The substantive content of collective agree-
ments, contracts, and statutes is of lesser importance for this preliminary task of 
labor law. What matters most for the metalevel is who decides the norms, how 
they are decided, and how norms and agents interrelate. The second function is 
to mark the borders of power in the relationship between workers, whether as 
individuals or as organized groups, and employers (again—individuals and 
associations). This is often deemed to be the central role of labor law. The 
third function of labor law is to mark the borders of power between workers 
and other workers, be they individuals or groups—whether they are working 
at present, have worked in the past (pensioners), or are unemployed. The third 
function is often presented as an insiders-outsiders problem but is generally 
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not placed on the same level as the second. In this book all three tasks are 
viewed as equally important for the study of labor both in itself and as an ex-
planatory framework for transition in other systems, and for reading labor law 
as a social text. The only caveat is that a methodological reading requires 
starting with the first task, as it lexically precedes the other two. Unless one 
understands the legal choices made at the metalevel, it is difficult to identify 
the relevant sources of law used to fulfill the other two functions. 
The general functions are not addressed in the same manner in all countries. 
A legal regime defines more particular objectives to fulfill the three functions, 
and these serve as a guideline for the development of the particular institu-
tions. These objectives are at the center of this discussion. For example, in the 
corporatist phase the first function was designed to ensure the supremacy of 
the collectively negotiated norm over all other norms (markets and statutory 
standards). After the decline of the corporatist regime, the objective of labor 
law was to strengthen both contractual and statutory norms over the collec-
tively negotiated norms. Some legal instruments were found to be conducive 
to accomplishing these objectives in the corporatist system (e.g., extension or-
ders and derogation arrangements) while others were tailored to the pluralist 
system (e.g., greater statutory and adjudicative intervention by means of flexi-
ble legal terms, such as "good faith"). 
It is argued that the different objectives and legal institutions used in the 
corporatist and pluralist phases of labor law are more than a coincidental con-
juncture of legal rules. In both phases, the objectives and the institutions used 
to fulfill them displayed a very clear and coherent logic. In the corporatist 
phase, labor law's objectives addressed the first function by granting auton-
omy to the social partners to negotiate social affairs at the level of civil society. 
This required a number of supportive legal institutions. First of these was the 
minimal intervention of law by means of mandatory employment standards in 
law. The initiative for the few laws that were passed usually came from the social 
partners, who viewed the statutory formalization of norms, which had already 
been established in collective bargaining, as beneficial to their own interests. 
At the same time, the law ensured that collectively bargained standards super-
seded individual negotiations, rendering individual contract law less impor-
tant. Given the objective of labor law regarding its first function, there was 
little need for law to fulfill the other two functions. The social partners were 
given the power to determine for themselves the legitimate use of power within 
the industrial relations system, and matters of inclusion and exclusion were de-
termined by means of collective agreements. It was therefore the first function, 
with its preference for leaving the governance of the labor market to autonomous 
self-regulation, that explains the almost total absence of law in the fulfillment 
of the other two functions. This is the notion of corporatist labor law—to con-
struct law that minimizes the role of law itself. 
In the second phase, roughly from 1987 onward, the corporatist objectives 
that facilitated negotiations on the basis of class at the level of civil society 
were no longer appropriate. Labor law was designed to entrench centralized 
bargaining, but centralized bargaining was declining. Law sought to encour-
age the social partners to resolve their own disputes, but the partners gradu-
ally drifted apart and delegitimized the system of disputes resolution itself. 
The new labor law was entrusted with the task of redefining objectives and 
creating new legal instruments to fulfill the three functions of labor law. On 
the one hand, as the industrial relations system was losing its collective fea-
tures, it appeared that individualized bargaining was becoming the most im-
portant method of labor market regulation. However, the legal response was 
to provide a countervailing force to market tendencies to take over the role of 
collective bargaining. The first task of labor law was achieved by means of 
centralizing the locus of power, decreasing the autonomy of the social part-
ners, and increasing the use of mandatory standards, even when the bargaining 
partners opposed such expansion. 
Once the authors of law took over the governance of the labor market from 
the social partners, they also had to provide a more detailed account regarding 
the other two functions of labor law. While in the corporatist phase the social 
partners determined the balance of power between labor and capital, as well as 
the borders between the insiders and outsiders, in the second phase these issues 
became a matter for legal determination. More particularly, the second task of 
labor law was addressed by prescribing new rules that resembled the American 
doctrines, such as rules on fair bargaining and duties of equality and public 
policy. Many of these rules were aimed at defining the rights of labor, which 
appeared to be at a disadvantage as a result of corporatism's decline. Similarly, 
as to labor law's third function, the new law distributed market privileges and 
rights between the insiders and outsiders of the labor market. Here, too, the 
law expropriated the distributive role from the bargaining partners. The second 
and third tasks of labor law were both accomplished with much detailed regu-
lation that sought to protect individuals at the cost of sometimes enforcing, at 
other times undermining, collective bargaining. This is the process of "juridifi-
cation" that characterizes the new labor law. 
The Structure of the Book 
The transition from the corporatist to the pluralist model of labor law suggests 
a number of questions to which this book will try to respond. First, to what ex-
tent can the decline of corporatism explain the rewriting of labor law? Second, 
did the legal rules matter? Would the outcome of the corporatist system's decline 
have been different if different legal objectives and instruments had been in 
place? And were the new objectives and legal instruments an inevitable outcome 
of the decline of corporatism? Or were they dependent on a certain historical 
sequence of events, that is, "path dependent" (Pierson 2000)? Finally, how do 
the legal texts and narratives help us understand the decline of corporatism? 
In a nutshell, the answers to all these questions reflect on the relationship 
between the legal and the industrial relations systems. On the one hand, the 
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estions reflect on the relationship 
ns systems. On the one hand, the 
analysis suggests that law is not the reason for corporatism's decline, but its 
changing objectives are indicative of transition. Moreover, the legal text is 
highly instructive for those who wish to understand the dramatic transforma-
tion of the Israeli industrial relations system. The study of the Israeli transfor-
mation further suggests that while the industrial relations system's influence 
on the legal system was strong in the corporatist phase, it is the legal system 
that influences the industrial relations system in the pluralist phase. 
This book shows that the transition that has taken place in Israel is path-
dependent and that its nature, scope, and pace were not determined by a uni-
versal logic of convergence but rather by history, economy, culture, and 
institutional design. The book also demonstrates how some strategic choices 
that were made in one system influenced developments in the other. For exam-
ple, the neglect of shop-floor participation in statutes and the judicial effort to 
secure the hegemonic position of the General Histadrut contributed to the in-
stitutional vacuum that came about with the decline of the latter. 
To substantiate the answers to these questions, the first part of this book 
sets the background for the study. It presents the theoretical framework that 
distinguishes between corporatism and pluralism as distinct methods of gover-
nance and interests representation. Chapter 1 concludes by identifying the 
questions posed by this framework about the relationship between law and 
industrial relations. While the distinction and questions are based on a com-
parative and theoretical framework, it is adapted to the Israeli variants of cor-
poratism and pluralism in chapter 2. 
Part 2 illustrates the development of labor law from 1920 until 1987, 
which, as indicated earlier, was chosen as the date to distinguish the first phase 
from the second. This analysis is divided chronologically and substantively 
into two chapters. Chapter 3 describes the years until 1968, when most of the 
important legal developments were in statutes. Chapter 4 describes the devel-
opments that took place after the labor courts system was founded in 1969. 
During those years, most developments were in the courtroom, as the statu-
tory framework was generally stable and relatively unchanged. 
Part 3 discusses the emergence of labor law's second phase from 1987 on-
ward. Each of the chapters in this part conceptualizes change in accordance 
with labor law's three functions. Chapter 5 discusses labor law's metalevel and 
the change from governance by peak-level bargaining in civil society to manda-
tory legal determination of rights. The discussion emphasizes what happened 
to the legal instruments that were developed to entrench the corporatist system, 
including extension orders, broad bargaining units, and derogation clauses in 
statutory standards. These examples demonstrate how little remained, either 
de jure or de facto, of the instruments that were constructed in the corporatist 
phase of labor law. Chapter 6 studies the second function of labor law— 
defining the mutual rights and obligations of workers and employers. The dis-
cussion identifies the new framing of workers' and employers' rights by 
observing the changes in jurisprudence on the freedom of association, the 
emergence of employees' property rights in their workplace, the changing role 
of the state in collective bargaining, and the gradual writing of an employees' 
bill of rights. Chapter 7 describes the transition in labor law with regard to the 
third function—that is, the relationship between workers, as individuals and 
groups, and other workers. The discussion of this often neglected function of la-
bor law draws on two major examples—the legal treatment of foreign workers 
and the debate on the legal regulation of temporary work agencies. 
Although the book tells a local story of change, its implications extend be-
yond the Israeli experience. Part 4 of this book seeks to generalize on a com-
parative and theoretical level. Chapter 8 draws on the findings of the Israeli 
experience to contrast the different objectives of corporatist and pluralist labor 
law in other countries. Chapter 9 further attempts to abstract from the Israeli 
situation by observing more broadly the relationship between law and indus-
trial relations. Instead of focusing on one or the other, as was demonstrated at 
the outset to be the more common approach, it emphasizes the relationship be-
tween the two. This provides a possibility of bridging legal and industrial-
relations scholarship and avoiding mutual assumptions of exogeneity. 
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1 Corporatism 
Theory and Institutional Design 
The term "corporatism," or "neocorporatism," appears in the writings of var-
ious disciplines.1 It also seems to adopt various meanings with a core of shared 
meaning, although the various definitions may not be entirely congruent. Some 
definitions emphasize institutional factors such as centralized collective bar-
gaining or high union density, while others emphasize governance based on so-
cial pacts. Some accounts of corporatism define it in a manner that is tailored to 
very particular systems, mostly those that prevailed in the Nordic countries. 
Such accounts emphasize the systemic logic of corporatism's institutions and 
its comprehensive outreach into all spheres of governance. However, other dis-
cussions of corporatism assume a much more limited meaning, increasing the 
applicability of corporatism to numerous systems. For example, corporatism 
is sometimes taken to mean centralized collective bargaining, in contrast to 
decentralized bargaining. 
Corporatism, and its opposite, pluralism, are terms that designate a frame-
work that describes a particular system of interests representation. These are 
the intersts of individuals and groups, and by the term "interests representa-
tion" I refer primarily to the institutions that voice these interests, but also to 
those that constitute, aggregate, resolve, and mediate diverse interests. At a high 
level of generality, corporatism has been described as "a system of interest 
1. The use of the term "neocorporatism" is intended to distinguish the modern European 
corporatist systems from fascist corporatism. Others distinguish, along similar lines, between 
societal and state corporatism (Schmitter 1974). Such distinctions emphasize the differences as 
well as the shared institutional logic of the varieties of corporatism. 
For the sake of convenience, in this book the term "corporatism" designates modern-day 
western neocorporatism, or societal corporatism. Only when explicitly mentioned will it refer 
to the older antidemocratic or South American state-controlled version of corporatism. 
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and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or ideal type institutional 
arrangement for linking associationally organized interests of civil society 
with the decisional structures of the state" (Schmitter 1974, 86). The main 
hallmark of corporatism in the governance of the labor market in particular 
and the broader social and economic spheres in general is extensive negotia-
tions between well-organized groups of labor and capital (employers), with 
the state actively involved (Teulings and Hartog 1998; Streeck and Schmitter 
1985; Katzenstein 1984; Schmitter 1974). These negotiations are conducted 
by means of collective bargaining agreements that are set at levels higher than 
the single enterprise, usually at the industry, regional, and state levels. Some 
agreements are elevated to the level of social pacts among the three agents rep-
resenting labor, employers, and the state. Their coverage is broad, and they 
commonly have a mandatory effect that makes them more powerful mecha-
nisms than merely voluntary guidelines and recommendations. The power of 
corporatism therefore derives from the construction of social consensus based 
on the principle of bipartite and tripartite negotiations. Corporatism is viewed 
as a midlevel governance system to be distinguished from the hierarchical 
power of the state and from private ordering, that is, individual-based market 
transactions. 
To understand the unique features of corporatism as a system of interests 
representation, it is useful to identify its "other." The alternative to corpo-
ratism posed in the literature is "pluralism" (Schmitter 1977, 1989). Plural-
ism is strongly associated with private ordering but need not imply an 
unfettered market environment. A pluralist system displays rules that govern 
the labor market, but these emerge from a different system of interests repre-
sentation. Trade unions are assimilated to other interest groups, and while 
employers' associations are rare, they are viewed as other organizations of 
business. The pluralist system recognizes collective bargaining but does little 
in terms of promoting it, treating it as a voluntary exchange between associ-
ations. Corporatism's emphasis on concentration and centralization in repre-
senting interests is not on the pluralist state's agenda. This does not deny the 
associations the possibility to advance coordination, but without the state's 
support such an objective is difficult to attain. As a result, collective negotia-
tions are for the most part decentralized and conducted at the enterprise 
level. Thus the pluralist system is a system that strongly preserves the nature 
of free exchange and admits collective bargaining to the extent that it is de-
sired by the workers and employers as individuals. Pluralism acknowledges 
the importance of legislation and the setting of substantive labor standards, 
but regulation is based on the relative power of political parties and the 
power of interest groups. Regulating labor does not assume any uniquely de-
signed scheme. 
Pluralism is presented as corporatism's "other" because it is easier to ad-
minister. It is based on liberties (such as the liberty of workers to associate and 
the liberty to vote) and not on the state's positive endorsement of rights and 
powers to specially designated social partners. When corporatist institutions 
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fade, pluralism remains as the default. Corporatism is a project that requires 
construction, while pluralism is a project that already exists. Hence, corpo-
ratism is often measured and studied, but pluralism is merely assumed. By 
comparison with the "normality" of pluralism, the logic and institutional de-
sign of corporatism seems particularly complex. 
It has been argued that the distinction between pluralism and corporatism is 
overstated and, at most, a caricature or an "ideal type" of two positions situ-
ated on a continuum, neither appearing in reality in its pure form (Bobacka 
2001, 20-24; Cox 1988). Indeed, when posing corporatism and pluralism as 
two sides that frame this project, it is clearly impossible to assign to each of 
the two terms a precise set of definitions and institutional examples. Instead, 
they should be treated as push-and-pull forces that mold the choice of institu-
tions for governing the labor market. Assuming the more general view of cor-
poratism, it is necessary to identify its core components (and by reversing 
them, the core components of pluralism as well). There are two ways to char-
acterize corporatism. The dominant method is to identify it on the basis of its 
institutions. A secondary approach is to observe corporatism's substantive 
outputs. This chapter surveys the fundamental institutions and norms associ-
ated with corporatism, with an emphasis on the former. With regard to both, 
the description is not intended to resolve methodological or theoretical ques-
tions but to illustrate the fundamental dilemmas associated with the corpo-
ratist design of governance. As will be demonstrated later, the institutional 
response to these dilemmas was at the core of the corporatist labor law that 
developed in Israel. The fading of the corporatist system in Israel awoke the 
dormant pluralist alternative. 
The Institutional Design of Corporatism 
On the basis of the general description of corporatism, it is possible to outline 
a number of fundamental features that comprise the corporatist structure. 
These features can be grouped into three interrelated categories: corporatist 
associations and the principle of state recognition, the internal organization of 
the associations ("internal characteristics"), and the interaction between them 
("relational characteristics "). 
Associations 
At the core of the,corporatist system are associations situated between the 
private and the public spheres, which are also distinguished from other volun-
tary communities and groups that function in civil society. Streeck and Schmit-
ter (1985) propose that corporatism is based on associations that, in their more 
perfect form, can be characterized as "private interest governments," "agencies 
of regulated self-regulation," or "the public use of private organized interests." 
The prominent associations that comprise the corporatist system represent the 
interests of labor and of employers, namely, trade unions and employers' as-
sociations. These associations are characterized by several features. First, they 
tend to have a generally high level of membership. This stems from two dif-
ferent factors. Many unions in corporatist regimes are not confined to the 
representation of workers in one workplace and therefore cover at least a sec-
tor (or industry), and some are based on statewide membership. In other cases, 
industry-based or occupational unions are part of a trade union confedera-
tion. Such confederations have two alternative structures. The more common 
structure is that in which independent unions join a confederation to which 
they delegate some of their power. Less common is the structure of the Israeli 
General Histadrut and the Austrian OGB, where the confederation is the pri-
mary union, from which the various trade unions branch off. 
Employers are similarly associated on a broad basis, although the employers' 
associations are not a mirror image of trade unions (Offe and Wiesenthal 
1985). Employers' associations by their very nature designate some form of 
centralization While trade unions can represent workers in one workplace, em-
ployers' associations, by definition, span several workplaces. Rarely will an 
employers' association be based on coordination among random or small 
groups of employers. The logic of organization for employers is typically based 
on coordination along a sector, industry, or region (including the entire state). 
The associations that take part in corporatist negotiations, on both sides, 
are not voluntary interest groups. They enjoy some form of state recognition, 
which is at least partially institutionalized and covers more than the freedom 
of collective bargaining and the freedom of contract. Institutionalized recog-
nition can be at different levels of intensity, ranging from consultation in pol-
icymaking, as is required by the Swiss Constitution, to exclusive licensing 
arrangements, as in the Austrian case.2 Another form of recognition is the del-
egation of authority usually held by the state in areas deemed to be a matter of 
social responsibility, such as the delegation of the unemployment funds' ad-
ministration in Sweden and Belgium to the trade unions—the so-called 
Ghent system.3 The unique position of the corporatist associations can be 
observed by the prevalence of formalized bi- and tripartite institutions.4 
These may include bodies for consultation and policymaking.5 Tripartite in-
stitutions can also be observed in the management of social welfare provi-
2. On the Swiss mode of constitutional recognition, see the Vernhemlassungsverfahren pro-
cedure (article 32.2 of the Swiss Constitution) granting associations the right to he consulted 
before legislative proceedings. On the Austrian mode of recognition in which employers must 
join the WKO and trade unions must be constructed within the institutional structure of the 
OGB, see Strasser and Kepler (1992, |502-10). 
3. See, for example, in Belgium, Vilrokx and Van Leemput (1998), and in Sweden, Kjellberg 
(1998, 101). 
4. Generally, formalized legal institutions are sometimes bipartite and at other times tripar-
tite, although this distinction should not be overstated, as the state is implicated once it estab-
lishes even bipartite institutions. Moreover, the bipartite institutions are generally in an ongoing 
relationship with the state as well. 
5. For an example in Belgium see Blanpain (2004, 11730, 742-44). 
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sions.6 Notably, the role of tripartitism is also highly visible in labor tribunals 
(EIRO 2004). 
Recognition must also be addressed at particular associations, not just at 
associations in general. That is, in a corporatist regime the state is implicated 
somehow in the identity of the associations. As will be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, recognition need not always be overt and explicit. It may 
also be hidden within general and seemingly neutral rules of association. 
The requirement of recognition highlights one of the major differences be-
tween corporatism and pluralism. Corporatist associations are distinct from 
voluntary associations. This distinction has been used to illustrate methodolog-
ical differences between the corporatist and the pluralist literature, as well as 
policy and practical differences. The comparison with pluralist systems is in-
structive because the basic unit of analysis for pluralism is individuals, whereas 
for corporatism it is associations. Accordingly, the questions posed by studies 
of these two systems are generally different. Pluralists inquire as to why indi-
viduals join communities, while corporatists are more interested in the forma-
tion of associations and how they are interrelated. An association is an organic 
entity, in which the group is larger than the sum of its parts. It has an existence 
that is separate from its constituency at a certain point in time, and individuals 
may join or leave it without changing its fundamental character. 
Associations in corporatist systems are different from those in pluralist sys-
tems because they are not formed spontaneously. Pluralism therefore assumes 
that communities attract members on a voluntary basis, catering to the imme-
diate self-interest of members. Different factors may account for individuals' 
affiliation with associations, including self-interest, state coercion, or merely 
an incalculable sense of belonging.7 Streeck and Schmitter (1985, 126) there-
fore argue a separate logic of collective action, whereby in corporatism the as-
sociations' members are "forced to give up what may often be opportunistically 
attractive possibilities for acting individually or through less formal groups, in 
exchange for accepting to be bound by compromised long-term and more gen-
eral obligations negotiated for them by their respective class, sectoral or pro-
fessional associations." 
Consequently, pluralism suggests spontaneous formation, numerical prolif-
eration, horizontal extension, and competitive interaction. Corporatism sug-
gests controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification, and 
complementary interdependence (Schmitter 1974). As Schmitter (1974; 1989, 
62) emphasizes, not every system in which organizations are involved can be 
called corporatist. The unique feature of associations in corporatism is their 
exclusive, quasi-legal position. Exclusivity is a result of the "singular, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered" nature of these associations. The quasi-
6. For an example in the Netherlands see Visser and Hemerijk (1997). 
7. In this sense, communitarian theory is better adapted to account for affiliation with cor-
poratism, and it offers a more diverse set of tools to account for affiliation than do the simple 
economic incentives assumed by liberal theory. 
legal position granted to these associations is what makes exclusivity possible 
within the domains of the rule of law. 
Internal Characteristics 
Corporatism requires inclusive associations that internalize the represented 
group's externalities in collective action and allow for hierarchical coordina-
tion between different levels of aggregate interests and group activity (Streeck 
and Schmitter 1991; Streeck 1995). The extent of the associations' control 
must match the market in which they negotiate. Thus, to achieve a negotiated 
ordering of the labor market in a given state, the unions and the employers' as-
sociations must be able to capture the market as a whole. This is achieved in 
two complementary ways. First, the associations must enjoy the broad sup-
port of their constituencies, including support for their representation of the 
constituency as a whole. This is the internal characteristic, denoting the struc-
ture of the associations and their relationship with their constituencies. Second, 
if the association does not enjoy the voluntary support of the constituency, 
then negotiations will have to extend beyond the voluntary constituency. This 
can be achieved with the active support of the state for corporatist negotiations 
and is hence a relational characteristic of those negotiations. This latter form of 
extending the corporatist agreement beyond the natural constituency will be 
discussed in the following subsection. 
The associations taking part in corporatist negotiations are characterized 
by a high level of concentration and centralization. "Concentration" refers to a 
limited degree of competition among associations representing one side of the 
corporatist triangle (Schmitter 1981; Cameron 1984; Golden 1993; Ebbing-
haus 2004). On the labor side, concentration appears either in the form of a 
clear jurisdictional divide, coupled with a high level of coordination among 
noncompeting unions, or as a combination of competition and a high level of 
coordination. To demonstrate the former, one can point at the clear jurisdic-
tional divide among trade unions in Germany, whereby each union represents 
one industry and each industry is represented by only one union (Weiss and 
Schmidt 2000, f321-36, 356-58). Moreover, most unions are federated in 
the DGB (The German Federation of Trade Unions). By contrast, in Belgium 
and the Netherlands there are competing federations of unions, structured 
along ideological and political lines, but there are also well-structured incen-
tives for cooperation among the federations, reflected in joint bargaining with 
employers (Visser and Hemerijck 1997, 83-87). Similar differences can also 
be found on the employers' side, although interassociational rivalry and com-
petition for membership are less common (Vatta 1999). 
Besides concentration, corporatist associations are also characterized by the 
"centralization" of authority. Concentration and centralization complement 
one another. As a consequence of concentration, which prevents interassocia-
tional rivalry (on both the labor and the employer side), the task of representing 
a very broad range of interests falls to only a handful of associations or feder-
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ations. Thus, one union or one federation may organize workers in various re-
gions, diverse industries, and numerous establishments. When the interests 
represented are few and homogeneous, centralized and decentralized repre-
sentation may yield similar bargaining positions. The outcome of negotiations 
will equally affect all those covered by an agreement. When the interests rep-
resented are highly varied, however, the importance of centralization is cru-
cial. Centralization ensures that broader interests will prevail over factional 
and local interests. Corporatist associations must provide a consolidated bar-
gaining position for all those represented. Similarly, they must bind all the af-
filiated associations and local organizations to their centralized policies. This 
does not prevent local variations in working conditions and even in wages. 
Variation may take place either within the framework negotiated by the cen-
tralized bodies or by means of a wage drift and supplementary bargaining at 
the local levels on qualitative (nonmonetary) issues, such as work time, shifts, 
and training (Wallerstein 1990). 
Associations do not naturally incline toward concentration and centraliza-
tion. In fact, sustaining these features is one of the major problems for corpo-
ratist associations in light of the interest of smaller factions (such as affiliate 
unions in a federation) in conducting their own negotiations separately from 
those of the association as a whole. This is an intrinsic feature of corporatist 
bargaining, as the interests of the stronger are compromised in favor of those of 
the weaker members. Alternatively, an association may deprive certain groups, 
particularly the weaker or politically vulnerable ones, to advance the interests 
of the dominant groups represented. Thus, whether a centralized association 
opts for solidarity in wages and equality or for the subordination of the weaker 
groups, some sense of dissatisfaction is likely to arise. 
The problem of legitimizing centralization may be mediated by the associa-
tion's efforts to instill in its membership a sense of fairness. This can be 
achieved by strategies of alternating losers and winners or by procedural prac-
tices of due process and democracy. It is, however, noteworthy that internal 
democracy can serve as both a threat and an effective aid to a centralized as-
sociation. It is an aid to the extent that it promotes the use of voice as an out-
let for dissatisfaction. At the same time, a simple representative democracy on 
the basis of one person, one vote may undermine the balance between internal 
factions and lead to an impasse in decision making. It is not surprising that 
one of the most effective ways of undermining associational structures is by 
imposing liberal-democratic requirements, as Margaret Thatcher proved so 
well in her labor law reform during the 1980s (Lockwood 2005). 
As opposed to the organizational strategies of associations for the purpose 
of satisfying their heterogeneous memberships, it is also possible to impose in-
stitutions that ensure the ongoing centralization of the association. Such insti-
tutions have been used as proxies for corporatist arrangements, including the 
power of the central body to appoint the leadership of the local industrial and 
occupational groups within it, the power to deny wage agreements negotiated 
by lower-level bodies, and the power to veto industrial conflicts initiated by 
the lower bodies and to control the strike funds accordingly (Wallerstein, 
Golden, and Lange 1997). Sometimes these institutions are self-imposed and 
fall within the compass of the associations' bylaws, while less often they are 
regulated by the state in the process of delegating authority and extending 
recognition.8 In both situations, these solutions do not easily resonate with 
democratic processes, and hence they present a constant tension, which is in-
trinsic to corporatist associations. 
Alternatively, it is possible to forge an alliance between macro-level corpo-
ratism (peak-level and centralized) and firm-level means of labor-management 
cooperation, such as works councils. Empirical studies have noted that such 
forms of cooperation are correlated to macro-level corporatist features (Hicks 
and Kenworthy 1998). As long as the works councils do not perform tradi-
tional union functions—namely, negotiations over wages and the initiation of 
industrial action—the local representation scheme does not undermine the 
logic of centralized bargaining (Thelen 2001). Collective bargaining between 
the centralized, industry-based unions fulfills the more adversarial function of 
labor-management relations, while the works councils, situated at the enter-
prise level, provide the more cooperative features. 
Together, concentration and centralization accommodate the singular voice 
of labor on the one hand and employers on the other hand. When the state is 
involved in bargaining as well, it also sends peak-level representatives, high-
ranking government officials, rather than low-ranking civil servants. For the 
state this entails coordination among the various ministries, e.g., those in 
charge of finance and labor. Further coordination is required with other gov-
ernmental or quasi-governmental institutions, such as the central bank or the 
social security agency.9 
Relational Characteristics 
The interaction among associations that characterizes corporatism involves 
"institutionalized and relatively centralized systems of collective bargaining" 
(Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange 1997). While the previous set of characteris-
tics refers to the internal structure of the associations on each side of the tri-
lateral relationship, the following characteristics refer to the interaction 
among them. These can be further separated into characteristics of the negoti-
ations process and those that refer to the implementation of the negotiations' 
outcomes. 
8. See, for example, in Austria, Strasser and Kepler (1992, 19-13) and Traxler (1993, 
246-48). 
9. At a relatively late stage of the writing on corporatism, the role of a central bank and its 
relationship with the state have been emphasized. Currently, some view this to be one of the 
fundamental features of a corporatist system (Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange 1997; Iversen 
1999), but there is an empirical question regarding the effects of centralization in collective 
bargaining and the role of the central bank and how they interact (Chou 2000; Sakamoto 
2005). 
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First, corporatism is characterized by bargaining between labor and em-
ployers at the peak level. The corporatist process emphasizes the construction 
of a broad political consensus by means of negotiations. Consequently, it is 
generally associated with a low level of industrial action initiated by unions, 
the abstention from unilateral action by the state and the employers, and the 
use of alternative means for dispute resolution, with regard to both legal and 
economic (interests) disputes. The mediation of interests by the governing po-
litical party, most notably in the social-democratic versions of corporatism, 
can also be described as part of the consensus-building process. 
Entering into negotiations is generally voluntary, but the parties' incentives 
to negotiate are frequently embedded within the system. These incentives in-
clude several important institutional factors, which appear in different corpo-
ratist systems to varying degree. First, the state has an important role in 
inducing negotiations. This is particularly evident in systems where corporatist 
associations, especially the trade unions, have been backed by social-democratic 
labor parties (Moene and Wallerstein 1995). In fact, some have recognized a 
special strain of "social-democratic corporatism" in which the alliance be-
tween labor and government has been an integral and stable component 
(Shalev 1992, 5-6). In these situations, the social-democratic party in power 
mediates conflicting demands and provides state aid in various forms to 
accommodate agreements (e.g., imposing tariffs, changing interest rates, 
changing income tax policy, or changing social security benefits and condi-
tions). The state, being the largest employer, can also serve as a "model em-
ployer," setting the pattern for private-sector bargaining; alternatively, it can 
draw on private-sector agreements to compensate for the absence of clear 
market signals in the public sector. Thus, the assumption that there are three 
separate parties in tripartite negotiations is misleading. The alliance between 
a governing party and a trade union, and its interest in gaining electoral sup-
port beyond the working class, ensures a checks-and-balances system in which 
the parties internalize one another's interests through various institutional 
mechanisms. 
The corporatist emphasis on broad and voluntary negotiations is also asso-
ciated with relatively low levels of strikes and industrial action (Korpi and 
Shalev 1979). The flip side of the coin is that employers and the state refrain 
from the unilateral use of power without resorting to prior negotiations. Nev-
ertheless, strikes continue to fulfill an important function in corporatism as 
well, often a result of the problems associated with the internal characteristics 
outlined above. Generally they are wildcat strikes (i.e., unauthorized by the 
trade union or the federation) initiated by the rank and file as their only means 
of protest once negotiations have been centralized, or as a means of winning a 
wage drift and other local concessions. Strikes can also be used by the cen-
tralized union as a means of obtaining legitimacy from the rank and file and 
demonstrating responsiveness to the workers' interests at times of compro-
mise. Otherwise stated, in corporatism strikes may be an outlet for demands 
that corporatism would prefer to silence.10 It has therefore been suggested that 
corporatism does not necessarily make strikes unnecessary but merely changes 
their nature and objectives. 
The second relational feature of corporatist institutions is the requirement 
that collective agreements will be mandatory, binding on all parties, and ex-
tended to regulate broad segments of the population. This requirement distin-
guishes corporatism from the view that collective relations are merely voluntary 
and nonenforceable (as was the case in the United Kingdom). Corporatism 
views the negotiations' outcomes as a substitute for legislation. Hence, the 
outcomes of negotiations must be binding in order to avoid individual deroga-
tions from the agreements that are shaped by the relative market power of the 
parties in individual transactions. Such derogations undermine the collective 
nature of arrangements and their role in the decommodification of an individ-
ual's status and well-being. This is a feature that generally appears in most 
systems of industrial relations, but its importance in corporatism is aug-
mented because of the central role of bargaining, the comprehensive scope of 
issues relegated to the sphere of social negotiations, and the distance between 
the bargaining agents and individuals. Consequently, the negotiations' out-
comes appear as binding as state laws to individual workers and firms. This 
application deviates from the law of contract, which holds obligations to be 
the product of individual consent. 
Various measures may be employed to achieve comprehensive coverage by 
collective agreements. It is possible to distinguish between measures that seek 
to ensure comprehensive coverage within the unit of bargaining and those that 
seek to extend coverage beyond the natural bargaining sphere (EIRO 2002). 
The former include, for example, laws that mandate the application of agree-
ments to members of the signatory union, as well as to members of other 
unions and nonmembers. A similar outcome can be reached by the signatories' 
consent to compulsion as a means of inducing the employer to extend agree-
ments to all the employees, or by employers' voluntary application of the 
agreements to all employees regardless of membership status. By contrast, ex-
tension orders, whether issued by the legislature or the executive branch, ap-
ply the agreements to employers who are not members of an employers' 
association and to their employees.11 Consequently, such employers lose the 
advantage of opting out of the representative organizations taking part in 
10. The Israeli case demonstrates this trend well. There are, however, other examples, such 
as Italy, where wildcat strikes emerged to contest the abolition of the scala mobile (Baccaro 
2003, 12). 
11. The common practice of issuing "awards" that characterized the unique nature of in-
dustrial relations in Australia and New Zealand in the past was also consistent with the objec-
tive of extending collective agreements beyond the domain of bargaining. The logic of extension 
can also be identified in the method of wage setting in the United Kingdom, through wage coun-
cils. While none of the three countries mentioned here can be classified as corporatist per se, it 
has been acknowledged that they sustained elements of centralized bargaining of a corporatist 
nature. 
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corporatist negotiations. It should be noted that corporatist extension of cov-
erage results from the external (to the social partners) extension of a particu-
lar collective agreement, rather than the voluntarily use of one agreement as a 
model for others, as is the case in pluralist pattern bargaining (Katz 1993).12 
The relatively rigid requirement that agreements should be broadly applica-
ble, mandatory, and binding, can be contrasted to the less rigid framework 
constructed for negotiations. A comprehensive ordering of the labor market 
through collective negotiations can be achieved if there is a very broad volun-
tary membership (e.g., when membership is motivated by the Ghent system) 
and a lesser level of intervention by the state in extending coverage of agree-
ments beyond the voluntary unit. Alternatively, a low level of membership re-
quires a high degree of external intervention to ensure a corporatist level of 
coverage. Broad voluntary membership is deemed more desirable because it 
attenuates the state's need to use power (i.e., law) to intervene in the ordering 
of the labor market. A high level of state intervention to ensure broad cover-
age may undermine the premises of corporatism. This is best demonstrated 
by the case of France, where fewer than 10 percent of the workers are trade 
union members but the coverage of collective agreements extends to over 90 
percent (Flanagen 1999). This is but one of many phenomena, on account of 
which France has been deemed an example of statism rather than corporatism. 
The Outcomes of Corporatist Systems 
The general definition of corporatism, thus far, has been procedural or struc-
tural in nature. Corporatism implies governance by means of negotiations and 
consensus building among singular, centralized, state-recognized associations 
representing labor and employers. This structural definition omits the sub-
stantive outcomes resulting from negotiations. However, corporatism has also 
been associated with various substantive norms, such as wage compression, 
wage restraint, low levels of unemployment, and lower levels of inequality. 
Must corporatism be defined on the basis of these outcomes (Cox 1988)? 
One answer holds that corporatism need not be associated with any one sub-
stantive outcome. One of the premises of the corporatist system is that associ-
ations negotiate their own norms. There is no one particular norm that can 
serve as a benchmark for the corporatist system. An alternative response sug-
gests that the nature of corporatist negotiations necessarily requires the preva-
lence of low unemployment because high levels of unemployment imply a 
12. Pattern bargaining designates a situation in which the trade union selects one employer 
with whom negotiations are conducted, followed by an attempt to replicate the collective agree-
ment to other employers in consecutive bargaining rounds. The distinction between corporatist 
arrangements for broad application of agreements and pluralist pattern bargaining is not clear-
cut. The German IG Metall's prominent role in wage bargaining for many years can be viewed 
as a hybrid of pluralist pattern bargaining and a nonformal method of corporatist wage coordi-
nation. 
dualist market and a failure of corporatist associations to advance broad in-
terests, rather than the narrow interests of the associations' members. Conse-
quently, failure to achieve this particular outcome is indicative of a systemic 
failure in the structural design of the corporatist system. This latter response 
suggests a type of reflective equilibrium between the characteristics of the pro-
cess and its substantive outcomes. 
What is the range of norms associated with corporatism? There has been a 
surge of theoretical and empirical literature on corporatism, starting in the 
early 1980s, pointing to corporatism's strengths and weaknesses. Although 
the literature is sometimes inconclusive and the empirical studies are open to 
criticism for their choice of typology in identifying corporatist regimes (Flana-
gan 1999, 1150-75; Leertouwer and de Haan 2002), it is nevertheless instruc-
tive for assessing the range of substantive norms associated with corporatism. 
Corporatism and Wage Restraint 
One line of studies ties corporatism and the centralization of collective 
bargaining with wage restraint. When unions act collectively, they accept 
greater wage restraint than they would otherwise concede if acting indepen-
dently (Moene, Wallerstein, and Hoel 1993). It is assumed that the bargain-
ing agents, especially when conducting negotiations in coordination with the 
state, are better informed about the macroeconomic conditions and are 
more capable of assessing the consequences of various policy options. It is 
further argued that corporatist institutions enable wage setters to avoid the 
various negative externalities driven by wage bargaining on behalf of small 
groups (Crouch 1985; Bruno and Sachs 1985; Calmfors and DriffiJ 1988; 
Soskice 1990). Lars Calmfors (1993, 161) summarizes various types of neg-
ative externalities that have been proposed in the literature. The externalities 
are derived from the rising labor costs for employers in collective negotia-
tions and are consequently distinguished by the agents who bear the rising 
costs: consumers, other producers, the economy, investors, and other em-
ployers competing for the same labor force. Of special significance is the 
externality that is imposed on other workers. This may take the form of in-
creased unemployment or an "envy externality" resulting from workers' inter-
subjective assessment of wages, or from the need to restructure efficiency-wage 
arrangements. Consequently, centralized bargaining avoids raising wages for 
one group without considering the effects on other groups, such as consumers 
or workers. 
Both explanations for the alleged relationship between corporatist struc-
tures and wage restraint have been contested. A critique of these arguments 
can take one of two forms. The stronger version is that corporatist negotia-
tions do not provide the benefits attributed to corporatism. The weaker ver-
sion holds that these benefits are related to corporatist systems but to other 
systems as well. The first critique holds that while corporatist associations 
have better information regarding macroeconomic performance, they suffer 
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from the same problem that governments have regarding the absence of infor-
mation on preferences at lower levels. Thus, information advantage on one 
level may be offset by information disadvantage at another. To demonstrate 
the second type of critique, Calmfors and Driffil (1988) make the argument 
that both highly centralized and decentralized systems fare well in terms of 
wage restraint, as opposed to systems in which wage bargaining is conducted 
at the midlevel (namely, the industry level). This type of critique is less detri-
mental to the values associated with corporatism because it only holds that 
with regard to this specific norm (wage restraint) corporatism is not the only 
system to yield such results. Generally, the relationship between the central-
ization of bargaining and wage restraint has been empirically demonstrated in 
either its strong (exclusive relationship) or weak (corporatism is one of the 
systems associated with wage restraint) versions (Calmfors 1993, 179-80). 
Corporatism and Full Employment 
Wage restraint is not only an end in itself; it is also correlated with the ob-
jective of full employment (Flanagen, Soskice, and Ulman 1983). This is 
merely an extension of the externalities problems noted above, yet it has been 
asserted to be one of the most important outcomes of corporatist bargaining. 
Given that a rise in wages can have adverse effects on employment levels, cen-
tralized bargaining is constrained by employment targets. On one side of the 
bargaining table, centralized unions continue to represent the unemployed 
and therefore internalize their interests as well. On the other side of the table, 
employers opt for wage restraint and higher employment levels, especially 
when raising wages would require them to initiate layoffs. The internalization 
of the negative externality caused by unemployment therefore helps to over-
come the "insiders-outsiders" problem, which pervades labor market gover-
nance by institutions (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). The evidence regarding 
the relationship between the centralization of wage setting and unemployment 
demonstrates the weaker thesis, according to which the centralization of wage 
setting is one way of promoting low levels of unemployment. As in the general 
discussion of wage restraint, the alternative method is highly decentralized 
bargaining—shaped for the most part by market forces with little institutional 
interference—or (less effectively) enterprise-based bargaining (Layard, Nickell, 
and Jackman 1991; Moene and Wallerstein 1995). 
Corporatism and Equality 
The association of corporatist systems with equality has also been demon-
strated. This stems from several factors. First, wage equality derives from the 
higher levels of wage compression (or lower levels of wage dispersion) that 
have been demonstrated to be correlated with corporatist arrangements (cf. 
Freeman 1988; Agell and Lommerud 1992; Rowthorn 1992). Unlike the am-
biguous evidence regarding wage restraint, the data consistently indicate that 
